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Note
Presuming Innocence: Expanding the
Confrontation Clause Analysis to Protect
Children and Defendants in Child Sexual Abuse
Prosecutions
Anna Richey-Allen∗
In an otherwise quiet courtroom, a prosecutor presses a
button on a remote control and presents his witness: a young
child on the television screen who is unwittingly testifying in a
court of law.1 The jurors hear three-year-old T.B. answer extensive questions from a child protection worker who recorded the
interview months earlier.2 T.B. gives the name of the defendant, Orlando Bobadilla.3 He says that Bobadilla touched his
“booty” and verifies that his booty is his buttocks.4 When the
tape finishes, silence again consumes the courtroom as twentythree-year-old Bobadilla is left without recourse in front of the
jury—his opportunity to question T.B. had just been turned off
with the television.5
∗ J.D. Candidate 2009, University of Minnesota Law School; B.A. 2003,
Sarah Lawrence College. The author thanks Professor Stephen Cribari and
the board and staff of the Minnesota Law Review, particularly Damon Brinson. She also sends a very special “mahalo” to Abigail Richey-Allen for love,
encouragement, and for sacrificing a day in Hawaii to help edit. Copyright ©
2008 by Anna Richey-Allen.
1. This introduction is taken from the Minnesota Supreme Court case,
State v. Bobadilla (Bobadilla II), 709 N.W.2d 243, 247–48 (Minn. 2006), which
reversed the Minnesota Court of Appeals, State v. Bobadilla (Bobadilla I), 690
N.W.2d 345, 349–50 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004), but which was recently discredited
upon federal habeas review. Bobadilla v. Carlson (Bobadilla III), 570 F. Supp.
2d 1098, 1100 (D. Minn. 2008) (granting an order of habeas corpus relief for
Orlando Bobadilla).
2. Bobadilla III, 570 F. Supp. 2d at 1101.
3. Id.
4. Id.; Bobadilla II, 709 N.W.2d at 247.
5. Bobadilla II, 709 N.W.2d at 246. At trial, Orlando Bobadilla was unable to cross-examine his accuser. After the videotape of T.B.’s statements, he
was afforded an opportunity to cross-examine the interviewer who took the
stand to provide foundation for the video. Id. at 248.
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Such a story is not unique in child sexual abuse cases.
While defendants face long-term prison sentences6 and ostracism during child sexual abuse trials,7 alleged child victims may
not appear in court to testify.8 Judges will often find that children are incompetent to testify, as in T.B.’s case, because children can be stunned into silence on the witness stand or fail to
understand basic notions of the truth.9 Prosecutors must thus
rely heavily on hearsay exceptions to admit a child victim’s outof-court statements at trial.10
Two Supreme Court cases, Crawford v. Washington11 and
Davis v. Washington12 bolstered the Confrontation Clause
analysis for admitting hearsay at criminal trials.13 If a witness
6. Criminal sexual misconduct is often a felony, sentenced by terms of
decades. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 609.342 (2006) (punishing criminal sexual
conduct in the first degree, including sexual contact with persons under the
age of thirteen, with up to thirty years in prison). In some states, child sexual
abuse carries sentences comparable to murder. See MICH. COMP. LAWS
§ 750.520b (2007) (punishing criminal sexual conduct, which includes sexual
penetration with a person under thirteen years of age, by imprisonment for
life or for any terms of years, with exceptions); Man Draws 145-Year Sentence
for Sexual Abuse of 7-Year-Old, FORT BEND NOW, Feb. 13, 2006, http://www
.fortbendnow.com/printer_friendly/9432.
7. Persons accused and convicted of crimes suffer from broken social ties
during their incarceration regardless of the crime. See, e.g., Joseph Murray,
The Effects of Imprisonment on Families and Children of Prisoners, in THE
EFFECTS OF IMPRISONMENT 442, 442 (Alison Liebling & Shadd Maruna eds.,
2005) (“Loss of outside relationships is considered the most painful aspect of
confinement for prisoners.”). Child sexual abusers are even more frequently
shunned as outcasts. E.g., Robert Blecker, Haven or Hell? Inside Lorton’s Central Prison: Experiences of Punishment Justified, 42 STAN. L. REV. 1149, 1172
(1990). Because child molesters are considered social pariahs, they are often
exposed to in-prison violence. Id.
8. Children may be found unavailable to testify if they are incompetent
because of mental capacity or age, an inability to discern the truth, or an inability to convey testimony to the jury. See, e.g., Robert P. Mosteller, Testing the
Testimonial Concept and Exceptions to Confrontation: “A Little Child Shall
Lead Them,” 82 IND. L.J. 917, 921–22 (2007).
9. Bobadilla II, 709 N.W.2d at 248. For more discussion on the effects of
trial on children, see Gail D. Cecchettini-Whaley, Note, Children as Witnesses
After Maryland v. Craig, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 1993, 2005 (1992). See also Myrna
Raeder, Remember the Ladies and the Children Too, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 311,
376 (2005) (discussing how trial may retraumatize abused children).
10. See, e.g., John H. Gleason, Crawford v. Washington and the Limits on
Admitting Hearsay in Criminal Trials, 93 ILL. B.J. 408, 411 (2005) (“For years,
prosecutors have relied on evidence of hearsay statements, especially in childabuse and domestic-abuse cases.”).
11. 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
12. 547 U.S. 813 (2006).
13. Davis, 547 U.S. at 821; Crawford, 541 U.S. at 59.
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is unavailable to testify in court, prosecutors may only admit
so-called testimonial hearsay if the defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the declarant.14 Davis characterized
this testimonial hearsay as statements made during nonemergency questioning where the primary purpose of the questioning is to “potentially establish facts or events for prosecution.”15
This primary purpose test poses significant problems in
child sexual abuse cases. Most states require that child abuse
investigations combine the efforts of police, psychologists, social
workers, nurses, and doctors.16 Child advocacy centers, many
functioning with funding from local prosecutor’s offices or the
Department of Justice, are the hub of such investigations.17
Replete with child-friendly rooms, anatomical dolls, and ageappropriate questioning, these centers purport to help children
through their difficult situations and gather evidence for trial.18
Because of these multiple purposes of child advocacy centers,19 courts have struggled with how to treat statements produced during child advocacy centers’ forensic interviews, where
trained specialists elicit a child’s story, oftentimes in front of a
video camera.20 Some courts have determined that the psychological or medical services trump the advocacy centers’ prosecu-

14. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 59.
15. Davis, 547 U.S. at 822.
16. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 626.556 (2006) (mandating cross-reporting and
joint investigations of child abuse allegations by law enforcement and child
welfare agencies). All fifty states mandate some type of reporting. Elizabeth J.
Stevens, Deputy-Doctors: The Medical Treatment Exception After Davis v.
Washington, 43 CAL. W. L. REV. 451, 477 (2007); see also, Mosteller, supra note
8, at 952 (discussing the mandatory reporting laws and requirements).
17. See Nancy Chandler, Children’s Advocacy Centers: Making a Difference One Child at a Time, 28 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 315, 330 (2006).
18. For an example of a child advocacy center’s goals and services, see
CornerHouse, Forensic Interview Services, http://www.cornerhousemn.org/
forensic.html (last visited Dec. 1, 2008). The National Children’s Advocacy
Center also provides a general example of a child advocacy center. See The National Children’s Advocacy Center, The CAC Model, http://www.nationalcac
.org/professionals/model/cac_model.html (last visited Dec. 1, 2008) [hereinafter
NCAC, The CAC Model].
19. See, e.g., Mosteller, supra note 8, at 965–75 (discussing the multiple
purposes behind making and gathering statements in child-abuse situations).
20. See State v. Hooper, No. 31025, 2006 WL 2328233, at *5 (Idaho Ct.
App. Aug. 11, 2006); State v. Henderson, 160 P.3d 776, 778 (Kan. 2007); State
v. Krasky, 736 N.W.2d 636, 640 (Minn. 2007); State v. Justus, 205 S.W.3d 872,
877 (Mo. 2006); State v. Blue, 717 N.W.2d 558, 560 (N.D. 2006); State v. Mack,
101 P.3d 349, 349 (Or. 2004).
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torial goals, while others have disagreed.21 In fact, Bobadilla
had to wait through several state court appeals before a federal
district court decided that his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation had been violated, granting him habeas corpus relief.22 Unfortunately, this was after the court had sentenced
him to 144 months in prison.23
This Note explores the prosecutorial use of children’s
statements made during forensic child advocacy interviews.
Part I provides a background of the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Confrontation Clause, child sexual abuse prosecution, child advocacy centers, and select state cases on this issue.
Part II argues that child advocacy centers have many purposes,
but where there is direct prosecutorial involvement in the interviews and no alternative-theory testing of the child, statements obtained in such interviews violate a defendant’s confrontation rights when used at trial absent the declarant’s
testimony. Part III proposes that the Confrontation Clause
analysis should expand to include presumptions that will guide
courts in determining whether such statements should be admissible. This solution not only protects the integrity of the
Sixth Amendment but also recognizes the unique difficulties of
child sexual abuse prosecutions.
I. THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE, CHILD ADVOCACY
CENTERS, AND STATE COURT RULINGS ON FORENSIC
INTERVIEW STATEMENTS
The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution
provides that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against
him. . . .”24 There has been significant development in the Confrontation Clause analysis that deals with accusatory hearsay.
21. Compare Henderson, 160 P.3d at 786 (emphasizing the importance of
law enforcement and criminal prosecution), with Krasky, 736 N.W.2d at 642
(finding that the purpose of section 626.556 of the Minnesota Statutes is not to
prosecute criminals or collect evidence for trial but to protect children whose
health or welfare may be jeopardized).
22. The Minnesota Court of Appeals first decided that Bobadilla’s confrontation rights had been violated, Bobadilla I, 690 N.W.2d 345, 349–50 (Minn.
Ct. App. 2004), but the state supreme court reversed. Bobadilla II, 709 N.W.2d
243, 257 (Minn. 2006). The federal district court that granted habeas relief to
Bobadilla found that Minnesota engaged in an “[u]nreasonable [a]pplication”
of the law. Bobadilla III, 570 F. Supp. 2d 1098, 1107 (D. Minn. 2008).
23. Bobadilla II, 709 N.W.2d at 246.
24. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. This right applies to states through the Fourteenth Amendment. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403 (1965).
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Child abuse cases often involve a child who cannot testify, and
child advocacy centers purport to fix this problem by conducting pretrial forensic interviews.25 But courts have recently
struggled with how to treat the statements obtained in those
interviews.
A. HEARSAY AND THE RIGHT TO CONFRONT WITNESSES
The right to confront witnesses is the right to crossexamine them—a fundamental principle, vital to discerning the
truth at trial.26 Face-to-face confrontation in particular—where
a defendant cross-examines a witness in court—is considered
essential for a fair trial. Facing a witness allows jurors to judge
a witness’s demeanor. The uncertainty in a witness’s voice, and
the perspiration on his brow, are supposed to reveal something
about a witness’s story that an audio or video tape, written
record, or repetition by a third party cannot.27
It has not been clear, however, whether the Confrontation
Clause’s right to confrontation also applies to a witness’s out-ofcourt statements, or hearsay.28 Because of its unreliability,
hearsay is generally barred from trial unless the statement
falls under an exception.29 The Supreme Court previously held
that the Confrontation Clause was satisfied when the hearsay
was sufficiently reliable,30 but two Supreme Court cases, Crawford and Davis, recognized that the core concern of the Sixth
Amendment is procedural. It does not matter that hearsay
statements are reliable, but rather that the defendant is able to

25. See Chandler, supra note 17, at 332 (discussing forensic interviewing).
26. See Perry v. Leeke, 488 U.S. 272, 283 (1989).
27. See, e.g., Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 845 (1990) (“The primary
object of the [Confrontation Clause] was to prevent depositions or ex parte affidavits . . . being used against the prisoner in lieu of . . . cross-examination of
the witness in which the accused has an opportunity, not only of testing the
recollection and sifting the conscience of the witness, but of compelling him to
stand face to face with the jury in order that they may look at him, and judge
by his demeanor upon the stand and the manner in which he gives his testimony whether he is worthy of belief.” (quoting Mattox v. United States, 56
U.S. 237, 242–43 (1895))).
28. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 42–43 (2004) (“The Constitution’s text does not alone resolve this case. One could plausibly read ‘witness
against’ a defendant to mean those who actually testify at trial . . . .”).
29. See FED. R. EVID. 803. Commonly used hearsay exceptions are statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis, present sense impressions, and
excited utterances. Id. 803(1), (2), & (4).
30. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980).
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cross-examine all witnesses who “bear testimony” both in and
out of court.31
1. Supreme Court Determinations: From Reliable to
Testimonial Hearsay
Under Ohio v. Roberts, courts could admit hearsay at trial
through discretionary standards.32 As long as a statement bore
sufficient “indicia of reliability,” meaning that it fell within a
“firmly rooted hearsay exception” or had “particularized guarantees of trustworthiness,” the Sixth Amendment did not prohibit the admission of the testimony.33 In Crawford, however,
the Court argued that the reliability standard of Roberts was
an “amorphous, if not entirely subjective concept”34 because it
allowed judges to individually devise which factors were trustworthy, without affording the defendant his fundamental right
to confront the testimony against him.35
The Court noted that the Confrontation Clause arose from
a concern for the civil law practice of using ex parte interviews
(or interrogations held in the absence of the accused) to prosecute defendants.36 Common law initially borrowed these aspects of civil law37 until the infamously corrupt trial of Sir Walter Raleigh.38 The evidence against Raleigh was the ex parte
testimony of his alleged accomplice who saved himself by implicating Raleigh in a private pretrial hearing.39 The trial judge
refused to let Raleigh confront the witness, and despite Raleigh’s pleas to have his accuser called “before [his] face,” the
judge ultimately sentenced Raleigh to death.40
To prevent such injuries to justice and to protect the rights
of the accused, cross-examination developed through a series of
statutory reforms and practices that are reflected in the Sixth
Amendment.41 In Crawford, the Court found that the “unpardonable vice” of the reliability standard in Roberts was that
51.

31. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 823 (2006); Crawford, 541 U.S. at
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66.
Id.
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 63.
Id.
Id. at 50.
Id. at 43.
Id. at 44.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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courts were admitting ex parte statements which the Confrontation Clause intended to exclude.42 Confrontation was the only
indicium of reliability that satisfied the Sixth Amendment, regardless of the admissibility of statements under famed hearsay exceptions.43
Not all out-of-court statements invoke the Sixth Amendment, however.44 Because the Confrontation Clause historically
concerned accusatory statements—that is, testimonial statements “made for the purpose of establishing or proving some
fact”45—the Sixth Amendment protects defendants from testimonial hearsay where there was no prior opportunity to crossexamine a witness who is unavailable to testify in court.46 Outof-court statements that are nontestimonial are admissible,
provided they fall under a hearsay exception.47
2. Definitions of Testimonial Hearsay
As it stands, there is no simple definition of “testimonial.”
In Crawford, the Court identified a “core class” of testimonial
hearsay that includes ex parte testimony or its “functional
equivalent.”48 This class includes statements such as those
“that declarants would reasonably expect to be used prosecutorially, . . . extrajudicial statements contained in formalized testimonial materials, such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or confessions” and statements that, under the
circumstances, would lead an objective witness to believe that
his statement would be “available for use at a later trial.”49 The
Court applied this analysis in Crawford and Davis by looking
at the case-specific circumstances at issue.50
To the Court, the level of government involvement in the
production of the statements,51 the formality of the interview,52
42. Id. at 63.
43. See id. at 69. One exception is dying declarations. Id. at 56 n.6. The
Court indicated that “the existence of that exception as a general rule of criminal hearsay law cannot be disputed.” Id.
44. Id. at 51.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 58.
47. Id. at 56.
48. Id. at 51–52.
49. Id.
50. See Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 817–21 (2006); Crawford, 541
U.S. at 66–67.
51. See Davis, 547 U.S. at 822–24.
52. See id. at 827, 831 n.5; Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51–52.
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and the elapsed time between the alleged crime and the challenged statements were of particular concern for Confrontation
Clause analysis.53 When the testimony is produced through the
“involvement of government officers . . . with an eye toward trial,” there is a “unique potential for prosecutorial abuse,” as
demonstrated in Sir Walter Raleigh’s trial.54 While Crawford
set forth the basic framework for defining testimonial statements, it did not discuss statements that fell short of its clearcut example: a woman’s statements made while in police custody.55
A few years after Crawford, the Court further distinguished testimonial and nontestimonial hearsay in two consolidated cases, Davis v. Washington and Hammon v. Indiana.56
The Court held that statements are nontestimonial where the
circumstances objectively indicate that police or their agents57
are responding to an ongoing emergency.58 Statements are testimonial when circumstances objectively indicate that there is
no emergency, and the interrogation’s “primary purpose [is to]
establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.”59 An “interrogation” is colloquially defined,
meaning that interviews conducted by government agents are
also subject to the testimonial framework.60
There is some debate as to whether this framework should
measure the declarant’s expectations. Davis set forth an objective-observer test by emphasizing the objective purpose of an
interrogation, but a footnote suggests that the declarant’s expectation in answering the questions is still important to the
constitutional analysis.61 Many courts and scholars, however,
have either found that the objective observer test is correct
“historically, doctrinally, and as a matter of policy,”62 or have
53. See Davis, 547 U.S. at 830.
54. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 56 n.6.
55. Id. at 65.
56. Davis, 547 U.S. at 813.
57. Id. at 823 n.2 (“If 911 operators are not themselves law enforcement
officers, they may at least be agents of law enforcement when they conduct interrogations of 911 callers. For purposes of this opinion (and without deciding
the point), we consider their acts to be acts of the police.”).
58. Id. at 822.
59. Id.
60. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 53 n.4.
61. Davis, 547 U.S. at 823 n.1 (“[I]t is in the final analysis of the declarant’s statements, not the interrogator’s questions, that the Confrontation
Clause requires us to evaluate.”).
62. Mosteller, supra note 8, at 984; see also Myrna Raeder, Comments on

1098

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[93:1090

placed little emphasis on the declarant’s expectations in the
testimonial analysis.63
Davis concluded that, where an alleged victim identified
her abuser in response to a 911 operator’s immediate inquiries,
the statements were nontestimonial and admissible.64 The
Court stated that the victim was describing an ongoing emergency in response to impromptu questioning by the operator,
which was necessary to assist in her emergency.65 By contrast,
the victim in Hammon gave handwritten statements directly to
the police after they arrived at her house,66 and the statements
were found to be inadmissible as testimonial hearsay.67 Although officers arrived a mere four minutes after the call, the
victim was in a separate room from the defendant when she
provided the statements, and the statements described past
events in response to police inquiries.68
Read together, Crawford and Davis establish that testimonial hearsay will not be admissible where the witness is unavailable to testify at trial and the defendant has not had a
prior opportunity to cross-examine the declarant. What is testimonial depends on circumstances objectively indicating the
interview’s primary purpose.
B. CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE CASES AND ADVOCACY CENTERS
Crawford and Davis pose problems for child abuse cases
when children do not testify at trial, and such situations are
commonplace.69 Most states have statutes determining that
Child Abuse Litigation in a “Testimonial” World: The Intersection of Competency, Hearsay, and Confrontation, 82 IND. L.J. 1009, 1012 (2007) (concluding
that Davis accords with the objective-observer test).
63. See State v. Henderson, 160 P.3d 776, 785 (Kan. 2007) (“A young victim’s awareness, or lack thereof, that her statement would be used to prosecute, is not dispositive of whether her statement is testimonial.”); State v. Justus, 205 S.W.3d 872, 880 (Mo. 2006) (noting that a child could realize his
statements would be used to prosecute an alleged offender).
64. Davis, 547 U.S. at 828–29. The Court noted that the operator’s inquiries could have evolved into eliciting testimonial statements once the inquiries
were no longer serving the emergency. Id. Trial courts were to strike these
statements through motions in limine. Id. at 829.
65. Id. at 828.
66. Id. at 832.
67. Id. at 830.
68. Id.
69. See Mosteller, supra note 8, at 920–22 (discussing how widespread the
problem is because courts have discretionary power to find children incompetent to testify and arguing that courts should encourage confrontation).
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children under a certain age will be found incompetent to testify if they lack the capacity to understand basic notions of the
truth, or are simply too terrified to testify.70 When the Supreme
Court established the reliability test in Roberts, child advocacy
centers were developing around the country71 and states
enacted statutes guaranteeing the trustworthiness of a child’s
statements given at advocacy centers.72 The statutes either explicitly stated that such statements were reliable,73 or they delineated in detail the steps of a joint investigation, including
the type of questioning that interviewers needed to ask, thus
securing that a given statement would be reliable.74
Child sexual abuse cases can be difficult to prosecute.75
The shame that abused children feel often silences them, and
victims can recant their stories.76 Child advocacy centers developed in the 1980s in an effort to empower children to come forward and stop the cycle of abuse.77 Working as a team, prosecu70. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 595.02(1)(m) (2006). At least forty states have
“tender years” statutes which determine competency with reference to age.
Snowden v. State, 846 A.2d 36, 39 n.7 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2004).
71. Advocacy centers began developing in the mid-1980s. See, e.g., The
National Children’s Advocacy Center, History, http://www.nationalcac.org/
ncac/history.html (last visited Dec. 1, 2008) [hereinafter NCAC, History] (describing the history of the National Children’s Advocacy Center). The Supreme
Court heard Ohio v. Roberts on November 26, 1979. 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
72. See State v. Snowden, 867 A.2d 314, 320 (Md. 2005) (“Following Roberts, many States enacted statutes allowing the admission into evidence of
certain hearsay statements in criminal trials.”); see also T.P. v. State, 911 So.
2d 1117, 1122 (Ala. Crim. App. 2004) (discussing how Alabama revamped legislation that would predicate an unavailable child witness’s statements).
73. See Cynthia J. Hennings, Accommodating Child Abuse Victims: Special Hearsay Exceptions in Sexual Offense Prosecutions, 16 OHIO N.U. L. REV.
663, 672 n.57 (listing statutes adopted by twenty-four states to ensure the reliability of child statements in child sex abuse cases).
74. At that time, some statutes required corroborating evidence before the
admission of hearsay. See Nora A. Uehlein, Annotation, Witnesses: Child
Competency Statutes, 60 A.L.R. 4th 369, 468 (1988).
75. See Lynn McLain, Children are Losing Maryland’s “Tender Years”
War, 27 U. BALT. L. REV. 21, 29 (1997) (noting that one difficulty in prosecution is that the abused children are often the only witnesses); Erin Thompson,
Comment, Child Sex Abuse Victims: How Will Their Stories Be Heard After
Crawford v. Washington?, 27 CAMPBELL L. REV. 279, 290 (2005) (“The prosecution of child sex crimes becomes increasingly difficult because young children
lose memory, traumatized children block memory, and victims blame themselves.”).
76. See, e.g., McLain, supra note 75, at 28 (discussing the reticence or intimidation an abused child might feel before coming forward).
77. The country’s leading child advocacy center was established in 1985
by a district attorney in Huntsville, Alabama. See NCAC, History, supra note
71.
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tors, social workers, nurses and physicians attempt to holistically tackle cases.78 Today, over six hundred child advocacy
centers are operating in the United States—at least one in
every state.79
Child advocacy centers follow a model that is structured to
minimize trauma for children alleging abuse.80 Many advocacy
centers emphasize that their primary goal is to serve the needs
of children,81 which is obvious in the centers’ brightly painted
walls, baskets of dolls, and shelves of therapeutic coloring
books.82 The ambiance, however, does not dilute the centers’
other purpose: to produce and preserve evidence for the prosecution of the alleged offenders.83
Child advocacy centers conduct forensic interviews which
use open-ended and developmentally appropriate questioning
techniques.84 The rooms are generally equipped with cameras
or two-way mirrors that allow an investigative team to monitor
and record the interviews.85 After the interview, the child
usually undergoes a medical examination performed by a phy-

78. See id.; CornerHouse, Forensic Interview Services, supra note 18 (explaining the coordinated efforts of law enforcement, child protection and prosecutors in assessing and investigating allegations of child abuse).
79. See NCAC, History, supra note 71 (stating that child abuse professionals from all fifty states have been trained by NCAC).
80. See id. Many child advocacy centers follow a “RATAC” protocol. See,
e.g., CornerHouse, Forensic Interview Services, supra note 18. The RATAC
protocol stands for rapport, anatomy identification, touch inquiry, abuse scenario, and closure. For a more detailed look at the protocol, see AM. PROSECUTOR RES. INST., FINDING WORDS: HALF A NATION BY 2010, at 2, 5–7 (2003),
http://www.ndaa.org/pdf/finding_words_2003.pdf.
81. See, e.g., Alan Riquelmy & Lily Gordon, Local Authorities Team Up to
Fight Child Sex Crimes, COLUMBUS LEDGER-ENQUIRER, June 10, 2007 (“‘The
primary purpose of the child advocacy center is to see the needs of a child are
always put first . . . .’” (quoting child advocate Angela Crabtree)).
82. See CornerHouse, Forensic Interview Services, supra note 18.
83. See, e.g., NCAC, The CAC Model, supra note 18 (stating that a benefit
to child advocacy centers is “increased successful prosecutions”).
84. See Emily Gurnon, New Ways of Interviewing Lessen Trauma for
Children: Past Errors Have Helped Improve Techniques to Detect Sexual
Abuse, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS, Apr. 22, 2007, at A1; CornerHouse, Forensic
Interview Services, supra note 18; NCAC, The CAC Model, supra note 18.
85. See Sarah Mishkin, Trauma Eased Through Efficiency, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, July 27, 2007, at 1 (reporting that an investigative team of police,
child protection services, and a guardian ad litem monitor interviews through
closed-circuit television); Riquelmy & Gordon, supra note 81 (reporting that
interview rooms at a Georgia child advocacy center have hidden cameras monitored by “a district attorney, a police officer and a Georgia Department of
Family and Children’s Services worker”).
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sician or nurse.86 If the investigation produces enough evidence
to build a case, prosecutors will use the evidence at trial.87 The
forensic interviewer and medical examiner will testify to the information gathered during the interview and examination and
the videotaped interview may be entered into evidence.88
C. STATE COURTS RESPOND: CHILD ADVOCACY INTERVIEWS AND
HEARSAY STATEMENTS AFTER CRAWFORD AND DAVIS
Clearly, the importance of prosecuting child abusers is
deeply felt in society. Hundreds of thousands of children are
sexually abused each year.89 Sexually abused children suffer
from anxiety and depression, and are at a greater risk of engaging in alcohol or drug abuse as adults.90 For more than twenty
years, child advocacy centers have collected children’s statements and put them before juries. It is no wonder that there
may be a “general reticence” to find a child’s statements testimonial.91
After Crawford and Davis, states have focused their testimonial inquiries on the so-called primary purpose of the investigation that generates the challenged statements:92 if the primary purpose of the interviews is not prosecutorial, then a
child’s statements are not testimonial.93 Since joint investiga86. See, e.g., CornerHouse, Forensic Medical Examinations, http://www
.cornerhousemn.org/medicalexams.html (last visited Dec. 1, 2008).
87. See, e.g., Riquelmy & Gordon, supra note 81 (noting that interviews at
a child advocacy center enable law enforcement, the district attorney, and other agencies to form a “team” that helps build a case and bring it to trial).
88. For examples of this occurrence, see State v. Krasky, 736 N.W.2d 636,
643 (Minn. 2007); Bobadilla II, 709 N.W.2d 243, 255–56 (Minn. 2006). See also
Robert P. Mosteller, Crawford v. Washington: Encouraging and Ensuring the
Confrontation of Witnesses, 39 U. RICH. L. REV. 511, 606 (2005) (discussing the
practice of eliciting testimony from doctors). Some states have, however, ruled
that this violates defendants’ confrontation rights. See, e.g., State v. Henderson, 160 P.3d 776, 782 (Kan. 2007) (finding that a trial court’s admission of a
videotaped interview of a three-year-old accuser violated the Confrontation
Clause).
89. The exact numbers are difficult to compute because of victim recantations and unreported incidents. The National Children’s Advocacy Center,
however, estimates that it helps more than 250,000 children annually. NCAC,
History, supra note 71.
90. See Thompson, supra note 75.
91. Mosteller, supra note 8, at 978.
92. See Henderson, 160 P.3d at 787 (discussing the primary purpose of a
videotaped interview); Krasky, 736 N.W.2d at 641 (arguing that the primary
purpose of a forensic interview of an alleged child sexual abuse victim is to ensure the general welfare of the child).
93. See Henderson, 160 P.3d at 787; Krasky, 736 N.W.2d at 641.
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tions statutes were created to protect children, Minnesota, for
example, found in State v. Krasky that the primary purpose of
the interview conducted pursuant to the joint investigation statute was to ensure the child’s welfare and so the court admitted
the statements from the interview as nontestimonial.94 But
other courts have rejected this argument.95
Krasky involved a child’s videotaped statements made at a
child advocacy center.96 The Minnesota Supreme Court held
that the statements were admissible as nontestimonial hearsay, even though the last contact the alleged victim had with
the defendant was eighteen months before the interview.97 The
state considered it “significant” that the interview was conducted “in accord with a statutory scheme”98 that was enacted
to protect the health and welfare of children.99 Disregarding the
fact that the interview had taken place at the behest of law enforcement and was conducted and videotaped in the presence of
police officers, the court found that the actual purpose of the interview was to ensure child welfare. According to the Minnesota Supreme Court, this was because child advocacy centers help
to protect a child’s health and safety.100 The court thus reasoned that under Crawford and Davis, statements produced at
the advocacy center could not violate the defendant’s confrontation rights because the primary purpose of the interview is to
protect a child’s welfare, not to put a predator behind bars.101
Kansas and Missouri, on the other hand, determined that
statements resulting from such interviews are testimonial.102
As in Krasky, the interviews took place some time after the alleged events and the statements were videotaped in front of law
enforcement officers.103 Following the standard confrontation
framework, the totality of circumstances—including the formality of the interview and level of government involvement—
showed that while the safety of the child was a concern, the
94. 736 N.W.2d at 641–42.
95. See Henderson, 160 P.3d at 782–92; State v. Snowden, 867 A.2d 314,
316 (Md. 2005).
96. 736 N.W.2d at 638–39.
97. Id. at 638 & n.1.
98. Id. at 641 (quoting Bobadilla II, 709 N.W.2d 243, 254 (Minn. 2006)).
99. Id.; see MINN. STAT. § 626.556, subdivs. 1, 10(a) (2006).
100. Krasky, 736 N.W.2d at 641.
101. Id.
102. State v. Henderson, 160 P.3d 776, 792 (Kan. 2007); State v. Justus,
205 S.W.3d 872, 874 (Mo. 2006).
103. Henderson, 160 P.3d at 778–79, 789; Justus, 205 S.W.3d at 881.

2009]

CONFRONTATION CLAUSE

1103

main effect of the investigation was to elicit the child’s testimony, just as a prosecutor would from a standing witness.104 Because no cross-examination of the accuser occurred at the center, the court found that the statements must be barred from
evidence when the child is incompetent to testify.105
These cases exemplify the problem with Davis’s primary
purpose test. Facing similar facts, state courts have remarkably arrived at opposite conclusions regarding a defendant’s constitutional right. This is because child advocacy centers have
many missions: promoting a child’s health and welfare, securing the child’s safety, and gathering evidence to be used in
prosecution. No one mission is above the rest, but as argued below, this should not erode certain testimonial aspects of the
child advocacy interviews.
II. NOTWITHSTANDING THEIR MANY PURPOSES,
CHILD ADVOCACY CENTERS PRODUCE
TESTIMONIAL HEARSAY
The Confrontation Clause bars the admission of testimonial hearsay where there was no opportunity to cross-examine
those statements. Because there are prosecutorial purposes to
the forensic interviews at child advocacy centers, and because
they are not conducted during an emergency, a child’s statements during such interviews should be scrutinized to determine whether they are testimonial. The extent of direct government involvement in the questioning, the monetary
prosecutorial incentives, and the lack of adversarial-like testing
are factors in determining whether these statements are testimonial, irrespective of the multiple purposes of the forensic interviews conducted at child advocacy centers.
A. THE MANY MISSIONS OF CHILD ADVOCACY CENTERS,
INCLUDING PROSECUTION
The National Children’s Advocacy Center—a model child
advocacy center which trains other child advocacy specialists—
defines child advocacy centers as “child-focused, communityoriented, facility-based program[s] in which representatives
from many disciplines meet to discuss and make decisions
about investigation, treatment and prosecution of child abuse

104. Henderson, 160 P.3d at 790; Justus, 205 S.W.3d at 880–81.
105. Henderson, 160 P.3d at 792; Justus, 205 S.W.3d at 881.
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cases.”106 It identifies four main objectives for the forensic evaluation of a child. The first objective is to determine “the likelihood of abuse.”107 The second is to “gather . . . facts necessary for
child protection and law enforcement . . . .”108 The third is to allow a child to recount his story in a “non-threatening environment.”109 And the fourth is “to make treatment recommendations.”110 Child welfare is integral to child advocacy centers by
both providing “needed mental health treatment and other services to children and families” and “coordinating and tracking
investigative, prosecutorial, child protection and treatment efforts” so that sexually abused children are not forgotten.111
1. The Psychological and Medical Purposes
Unlike many adult victims, abused children need other
people to assess their situation to make sure they are no longer
in harm’s way, and child advocacy centers attempt to provide
this service.112 Interviewers inquire into whether the child is
still in contact with the person who is hurting him.113 Questions about the past events assist the doctors in alleviating the
current medical condition of the child.114
The benefits of the child advocacy model are apparent
when considering the hysteria that can surround child sexual
abuse cases. In the 1980s, there was an increase in the number
of child sexual abuse cases, particularly involving childmolestation rings.115 The lure of capturing sexual predators
106. The National Children’s Advocacy Center, What Is a Child Advocacy
Center?, http://www.nationalcac.org/ncac/what_is_cac.html (last visited Dec. 1,
2008).
107. The National Children’s Advocacy Center, Extended Forensic Evaluations, http://www.nationalcac.org/professionals/model/forensic_eval.html (last
visited Dec. 1, 2008).
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. E.g., NCAC, The CAC Model, supra note 18.
112. See, e.g., CornerHouse, Forensic Interview Services, supra note 18
(describing a local child advocacy center’s mission as trying “to maintain the
highest quality intervention system for children alleged to be victims of abuse
and violence”).
113. See Mosteller, supra note 8, at 951, 953–54.
114. Id. at 951.
115. Lola Vollen & Dave Eggers, A Culture of Fear: A Series of Child Abuse
Cases in the Mid-1980s Caused Mass Hysteria, in SURVIVING JUSTICE: AMERICA’S WRONGFULLY CONVICTED AND EXONERATED 186 (Vollen & Eggers eds.,
2005).
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caused some prosecutors to pursue cases that “def[ied] logic.”116
Upon repeated questioning by prosecutors, social workers, and
law enforcement, uncorroborated stories of sexual abuse developed into tales of satanic killings, cannibalism, and never-to-befound underground tunnels and castles.117
At that time, little had been studied about child susceptibility to false memories and many coercive interview techniques led to predator “witch hunts.”118 The McMartin Preschool case is one such example. The case involved several
defendants, took over six years, and cost more than $15 million.119 The accused parties spent a total of nine years behind
bars while facing “patently absurd” charges120 involving
witches, warlocks, and satanic rituals.121 Other cases include
the Wee-Care Nursery School teacher, Kelly Michaels, who according to her child-accusers forced students to eat excrement,122 and Dale Akiki, a disfigured Sunday school teacher,
who children claimed had killed animals and drank their blood
before engaging in sex rituals.123 In Jordan, Minnesota, one
prosecutor charged twenty-four people with molesting thirtyseven children who had alleged that the adults had orgies with
them during which children were stabbed, shot, and beheaded.124 None of these charges, it turns out, were true.125
116. Jonathan Kaminsky, Devil’s Advocate: What Would a Lawyer Do to
Clear His Client of Child Sexual Abuse Charges?, CITY PAGES (Minneapolis,
Minn.), July 11, 2007, at 15.
117. See, e.g., TERENCE W. CAMPBELL, SMOKE AND MIRRORS: THE DEVASTATING EFFECT OF FALSE SEXUAL ABUSE CLAIMS 4–14 (1998) (detailing the
charges of various sexual abuse cases).
118. See John Stoll, If a Five-Year-Old Says You Did It, You Did It, in SURVIVING JUSTICE, supra note 115, at 179–85; Jacob V. Lamar, Jr. & J. Madeline
Nash, Disturbing End of a Nightmare, TIME, Feb. 25, 1985, at 22 (describing a
case from Jordan, Minnesota where twenty-four adults were charged with molesting thirty-seven children as a “witch-hunt”).
119. CAMPBELL, supra note 117, at 4.
120. Id.
121. PAUL EBERLE & SHIRLEY EBERLE, THE ABUSE OF INNOCENCE: THE
MCMARTIN PRESCHOOL TRIAL 20, 27–28 (1993).
122. CAMPBELL, supra note 117, at 14.
123. Frontline, Innocence Lost the Plea: Other Well-Known Cases, http://
www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/innocence/etc/other.html (last visited
Dec. 1, 2008).
124. No children, however, were ever reported missing and no bodies were
ever found. Kaminsky, supra note 116, at 15.
125. Five of the seven defendants in the McMartin Preschool case were
found not guilty, and the jury could not reach a unanimous decision for the
remaining two defendants. CAMPBELL, supra note 117, at 4. Dale Akiki was
acquitted on all charges and later brought suit against prosecutors for libel
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How could this happen? By the time any of these children
actually testified at trial they had repeatedly met with social
workers, therapists, police, prosecutors, and doctors, and the
stories they ultimately presented were not their own.126 Interviewers often used suggestive questions127 and many of the
meetings were undocumented, providing no opportunity to
check their veracity.128 While some defendants were acquitted,129 exonerated,130 or had their cases dismissed131 the

and emotional distress. Frontline, supra note 123. Kelly Michaels’s conviction
was overturned eight years after the case’s inception. CAMPBELL, supra note
117, at 19. As for the cases in Jordan, Minnesota, one defendant pleaded
guilty, two were acquitted, and the remaining twenty-one charges were voluntarily dropped. Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 868–69 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting). An investigation by the Minnesota Attorney General found no credible evidence to substantiate the allegations. Id.
126. See Craig, 497 U.S. at 869; CAMPBELL, supra note 117, at 64–80 (discussing coercive interview techniques and the results of repetitive meetings);
Kaminsky, supra note 116, at 18.
127. See, e.g., CAMPBELL, supra note 117, at 64–68 (providing extensive examples of the various way questioners repetitively assumed conclusions during forensic interviews, despite children refuting them). Interviewers not only
used leading questions, but they often disregarded indications that a child had
not been abused. Id. During one interview for the Kelly Michaels case, the interviewer proceeded as follows:
Interviewer: Did Kelly have public [sic] hair?
Child: Nah, I know cause it’s grown ups . . . I know about that.
Interviewer: So I guess that means you saw her private parts, huh?
Did Kelly ask the kids to look at her private parts, or to kiss her private part or…
Child: I didn’t really do that. . . I didn’t even do it.
Interviewer: But she made you.
Child: She made me. She made me . . . But I couldn’t do it . . . So I
didn’t really do it. I didn’t do it.
Interviewer: Did it smell good?
Child: Shhh.
Interviewer: Her private parts?
Child: I don’t know.
Interviewer: Did it taste good? Did it taste like chocolate?
Id. at 64–65.
128. See, e.g., Frontline, supra note 123.
129. CAMPBELL, supra note 117, at 4 (noting the acquittal of the McMartin
defendants).
130. See, e.g., Stoll, supra note 118, at 197–99 (providing an essay of a man
who spent nineteen years in prison before being exonerated of molesting his
son and other children).
131. See, e.g., Minnesota Says Abuse Case Was Improperly Conducted, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 13, 1985, at A16 (noting that child sexual abuse charges against
twenty-one defendants had been dropped in light of prosecutorial misconduct).
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charges brought against them were at an irreparable cost to the
state and their individual lives.132
Child advocacy centers purport to have corrected certain
problems that occurred in these situations.133 Training sessions
teach multidisciplinary teams the fundamentals of child development, suggestibility, and corroborating a child’s story.134 Instead of routing the child through interviews with the police,
then the social worker, then the psychologist, and then again
with a police officer, the child may go to one place where he
feels safe and protected.135 The interviewer is supposed to ask
nonleading questions, and a video camera is to capture the alleged victim’s testimony closer to the time of the event in question than the trial, thus minimizing the possibility of exaggerated stories.136 While this format resolves some of the concerns
about false accusations, today’s child advocacy centers still
have many flaws. The most notable are the lack of adversarial
testing of the child alleging abuse and the very strong prosecutorial ties to the centers.
2. The Prosecutorial Purpose
Regardless of other goals, child advocacy centers have a
clear prosecutorial purpose. Davis expressed a specific concern
over the involvement of “government officers” in an interview
because of the potential for prosecutorial abuse,137 which had
already been well documented in child sexual abuse cases like
the McMartin Preschool case.138 While the scope of the defini132. See, e.g., CAMPBELL, supra note 117, at 4 (detailing the cost of the
McMartin case). False accusations also have damaging effects on children. See,
e.g., Maggie Jones, Who Was Abused?, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Sept. 19, 2004, at 78.
One boy, who accused his mother of abuse, wrote in a poem: “She didn’t do it. I
was forced to lie. Here I go to cry, cry, cry.” Id. at 80.
133. See Gurnon, supra note 84; Childhelp, Advocacy Centers, http://
www.childhelp.org/about/programs-and-services/childhelp-national-childabuse-hotline-1-800-4-a-child/advocacy-centers (last visited Dec. 1, 2008) (listing child advocacy centers’ advantages).
134. AM. PROSECUTOR RES. INST., supra note 80.
135. See, e.g., Bobadilla II, 709 N.W.2d 243, 255 (Minn. 2006) (“Avoiding
multiple interviews is a critical concern when dealing with children not only
because the interviews are often traumatic for the child, but also because multiple interviews increase the chance that the children will be confused by unnecessarily suggestive questions.”).
136. See Gurnon, supra note 84; Childhelp, Advocacy Centers, supra note
133.
137. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 824 (2006).
138. See CAMPBELL, supra note 117; Vollen & Eggers, supra note 115; CAPTURING THE FRIEDMANS (HBO Documentary 2003) (documenting one family’s
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tion of a government officer was once seemingly limited to law
enforcement, perhaps excluding child advocacy interviewers
from the prosecutorial analysis, Davis noted that a 911 operator was, at the very least, an “agent[] of law enforcement”139
and her questioning was indistinguishable from police interrogations for purposes of the Sixth Amendment.140
Similarly, while the interviewers at child advocacy centers
are usually specially trained nurses, social workers, or physicians—not police officers or 911 operators141—forensic work is
integral to their jobs.142 Though they do not wear badges, the
interviewers are acting on behalf of the prosecuting government.143 Child advocacy centers have even received monetary
incentives to prosecute alleged abusers.144 The Department of
Justice and local prosecutors’ offices give large grants to centers, sometimes totaling millions of dollars.145
More important, the questions in the interviews are purposely structured to elicit the child’s accusatory statements.146
In order to “help prosecutors build stronger cases and put more
abusers behind bars,” the centers have streamlined evidencegathering, and prosecutors or police may have an immediate
say in how the interview is conducted.147 Videotaped recordings
journey through sexual abuse charges); Frontline: Innocence Lost the Plea
(PBS television broadcast May 27, 1997).
139. Davis, 547 U.S. at 823 n.2.
140. Id. at 838.
141. See Gurnon, supra note 84; Childhelp, Advocacy Centers, supra note
133; CornerHouse, Forensic Interview Services, supra note 18.
142. See AM. PROSECUTOR RES. INST., supra note 80; CornerHouse, Forensic Interview Services, supra note 18. Even if interviewers and examiners are
not government agents, the Court has suggested that statements may be testimonial if they are made to “neutral” parties. As Crawford noted, the framers
would have been “astounded to learn that ex parte testimony could be admitted . . . because it was elicited by ‘neutral’ government officers.” Crawford v.
Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 66 (2004).
143. See State v. Snowden, 867 A.2d 314, 326 (Md. 2005) (noting that the
social worker’s role as the interviewer was “little different from the role of a
police officer in a routine police interrogation”); State v. Mack, 101 P.3d 349,
352 (Or. 2004) (finding that a social worker was serving as a “proxy for the police”).
144. See, e.g., Kaminsky, supra note 116, at 16.
145. See, e.g., id. at 18 (noting that grants from the Department of Justice
have given one child advocacy center $1.7 million since 1999).
146. See, e.g., AM. PROSECUTOR RES. INST., supra note 80; CornerHouse,
Forensic Interview Services, supra note 18 (describing Cornerhouse Interagency Child Abuse Evaluation and Training Center’s processes for assessing
and investigating reported instances of child abuse).
147. Mishkin, supra note 85 (quoting a child advocacy center social work-
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are either shown to juries, or they may be used to help prosecutors in their investigations.
By acting on police referrals, providing prosecution with
collected evidence, and in receiving financial support from the
same coffers as prosecutors, child advocacy centers have a prosecutorial nature.148 The reality that forensic interviews may
have multiple purposes cannot simply expunge the prosecutorial force behind the centers. A medical examination purpose, or
safety purpose or psychological purpose is simply not a “talisman for a nontestimonial determination,”149 but neither does
the prosecutorial nature obliterate the centers’ other vital
tasks.
B. A TESTIMONIAL INDICATION: THE NONEMERGENCY
SITUATION
As required by Davis, in order for statements to be testimonial, not only must they have a prosecutorial purpose, but
the circumstances must objectively indicate that there is not an
ongoing emergency. While Davis “muddies its analysis in a
footnote”150 which declares that the Confrontation Clause concerns a declarant’s expectation in making the statement,151 the
objective purpose of statements from a child’s perspective
would be fruitless, if not impossible to determine, because
children may lack capacity to understand the consequences of
their statements.152 State courts seem to agree that the objecer).
148. See T.P. v. State, 911 So.2d 1117, 1123 (Ala. Crim. App. 2004) (finding
that because the child’s statements arose out of an interview with social workers and police officer working as a criminal investigation team, the interview
was similar to a police investigation); Mack, 101 P.3d at 352 (finding that the
caseworker conducting the interview “was serving as a proxy for the police”).
But see State v. Vigil, 127 P.3d 916, 923–24 (Colo. 2006) (“The fact that the
doctor was a member of a child protection team does not, in and of itself, make
him a government official absent a more direct and controlling police presence
. . . .”).
149. Mosteller, supra note 8, at 957. Many courts have also agreed. See
United States v. Bordeaux, 400 F.3d 548, 555–59 (8th Cir. 2005) (addressing
the issues inherent to “forensic interviews” with respect to the Confrontation
Clause); State v. Snowden, 867 A.2d 314, 320–33 (Md. 2005) (discussing the
admissibility of ex parte testimony); Mack, 101 P.3d at 349 (determining the
question of whether statements made by a child to a Department of Human
Services caseworker were admissible).
150. Raeder, supra note 62, at 1012–13.
151. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 n.1 (2006).
152. See, e.g., Raeder, supra note 62, at 1012 (discussing the viability of an
assumption that “the stress of the event . . . defeat[s] the [child’s] ability to
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tive purpose of the interviews counts for Sixth Amendment
analysis.153 At most, a victim’s awareness that his statements
would later be used to prosecute the alleged perpetrator should
be “but one factor” for courts to consider in light of Davis and
Crawford.154
Analyzing the centers from an objective-observer point of
view instead, one can see that the forensic interviewers are typically not questioning children in response to an ongoing emergency. Child advocacy centers are not in emergency rooms—
they are separate from hospitals and police stations; and most
of the interviews are conducted at least several hours, if not
years, after the alleged abuse.155 Children are likely very far
away from their alleged abuser, and many interviewers engage
the child by using forensic dolls or children’s books before the
interview so that the child is not only calm, but comfortable.156
To compare, the Supreme Court found that the victim in Hammon made testimonial statements in a nonemergency situation
where she was in a separate room from the defendant—but in
the same house—and where the 911 call had been placed only
four minutes prior to her statements.157
The circumstances most commonly associated with interviews at child advocacy centers indicate that the statements
from those interviews are made under nonemergency conditions. While it may be true that child sexual abuse is an omnipresent emergency—that society’s sirens should sound so long
as predators are loose—so is the notion that a defendant’s constitutional right to confrontation is being violated.
lie”).
153. See State v. Hooper, No. 31025, 2006 WL 2328233 (Idaho Ct. App.
Aug. 11 2006); Snowden, 867 A.2d at 324; Mosteller, supra note 8, at 984 (“The
primary focus in Crawford was on the method by which government officials
elicited out-of-court statements for use in criminal trials, not on the declarant’s intent or purpose in making the statement.”); Raeder, supra note 62, at
1012 (“I believe the Supreme Court, like the majority of appellate courts,
would reject interpreting the objective observer standard from the perspective
of a child of similar age.”).
154. State v. Henderson, 160 P.3d 776, 785 (Kan. 2007).
155. For example, the interview in State v. Krasky occurred eighteen
months after any possible contact with the defendant. 736 N.W.2d 636, 638
n.1 (Minn. 2007). The interview in Henderson was a few weeks afterwards.
Henderson, 160 P.3d at 778.
156. See, e.g., AM. PROSECUTOR RES. INST., supra note 80 (discussing the
program’s various interviewing procedures); CornerHouse, Forensic Interview
Services, supra note 18.
157. Hammon v. Indiana, 547 U.S. 813, 813 (2006).
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C. CIRCUMSTANCES THAT PRODUCE TESTIMONIAL HEARSAY:
PROSECUTORIAL CONNECTIONS AND NO ADVERSARIAL TESTING
Finally, despite child advocacy centers’ many purposes,
certain circumstances make the statements from their forensic
interviews testimonial. As established, these interviews do
have prosecutorial goals and they are conducted in nonemergency situations. When prosecutors and police are directly
involved in questioning the child, when there is monetary incentive to prosecute, or when there is no adversarial-like testing of the child, the function of the interviews turns primarily
prosecutorial, and the statements become testimonial.
1. A Prosecutorial Examination
As previously discussed, the right to confrontation arose
out of anxiety over ex parte examinations which could implicate
defendants without affording the opportunity to cross-examine
the accusers. Child advocacy interviews can resemble ex parte
hearings because of heavy prosecutorial involvement. Many
joint investigation statutes require interviewers to work with
police officers and prosecutors,158 and interviewers sometimes
meet with the prosecution team even before meeting the
child.159 Similarly, because officers are often notified of alleged
abuse before the child advocacy centers, they refer victims and
their families to the centers, and sometimes even drive them
there.160 The interviewer may only then be briefed on the case
by the officer or given a police report.161
During the interview, police officers and prosecutors can
monitor the child’s statements and directly manipulate the interview.162 Prosecutors and police may be in the interview
158. See MINN. STAT. § 626.556 (2006) (requiring interagency coordination); State v. Buda, 912 A.2d 735, 743 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2006) (discussing how child advocacy workers are “charged with taking action, using
court proceedings, to protect the best interests of the child” and must report all
suspected abuse to the county prosecutor (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:6–8.36a
(2006); N.J. ADMIN. CODE 10:129-1 (2006))).
159. See State v. Vigil, 127 P.3d 916, 935–36 (Colo. 2006) (retelling how,
before the doctor conducted the forensic exam, an officer spoke with him about
the background of her sexual assault investigation); Buda, 912 A.2d at 743
(noting that a child-advocacy worker talked with the prosecutor’s investigator
before interviewing a child).
160. Vigil, 127 P.3d at 935–36.
161. See State v. Snowden, 867 A.2d 314, 326 (Md. 2005).
162. For examples of this occurrence, see State v. Henderson, 160 P.3d 776,
787 (Kan. 2007); State v. Mack, 101 P.3d 349, 349–50 (Or. 2004) (discussing
the presence of law enforcement during the forensic interview).
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room, as was the case for Bobadilla,163 or they may watch from
behind a two-way mirror164 or via closed-circuit television.165
After asking initial questions, interviewers may leave the meeting, consult with the prosecutor, and then return to the child
for more questioning in case the prosecutor thinks something
was missed.166 Though there is an intermediary person between the prosecutor’s question and the victim in this situation,
it is as if the direct examination of the accuser has begun, but
no one invited the defendant, or the jurors. By directly involving prosecutors in eliciting a child’s testimony, the multiple
purposes of the interview fade into a primary prosecutorial
function, causing the statements to become testimonial. Prosecutors, after all, can only protect a child’s health or safety by
locking up the alleged abuser.
2. The Lack of Adversarial Testing
Crawford and Davis expressed concern with interviews
that were “weaker substitute[s]” for live testimony because the
Confrontation Clause demands that the accused be able to test
the veracity of his accuser’s statements.167 Child advocacy interviews appear to fall into this category. Although the interviews are formal, as with any trial examination, there is little
to no investigation into the truth of the allegations.
Child advocacy interviews follow a protocol to “ascertain[]
whether abuse [has] occurred.”168 Despite attempts to “steer[]
clear of leading questions,”169 investigative inquiries establish a
background story.170 In State v. Justus,171 for example, the interviewer “reminded [the victim] that she had said earlier that
she did not like her daddy and that he had kissed her ‘pee-

163. Bobadilla III, 570 F. Supp. 2d 1098, 1101 (D. Minn. 2008).
164. See, e.g., In Re Rolandis G., 817 N.E.2d 183, 188 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004).
165. Mishkin, supra note 85.
166. See, e.g., Gurnon, supra note 84 (describing how an observer, such as a
police officer, “can call the interviewer from the adjoining room to ask . . .
another line of questioning”).
167. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 827 (2006) (citing United States v.
Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 394 (1986)).
168. Bobadilla II, 709 N.W.2d 243, 247 (Minn. 2006).
169. Kaminsky, supra note 116.
170. See Bobadilla II, 709 N.W.2d at 247 (noting that the child-protection
worker began the interview that was meant to be open-ended by asking “[h]as
anybody hurt your body” and reaffirming the child’s answer when he named
the perpetrator).
171. 205 S.W.3d 872, 876 (Mo. 2006).
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pee’”—though there was no verifiable evidence that the child
had, in fact, made that statement.172
Even if questions are not leading, “the Framers were no
more willing to exempt from cross-examination volunteered
testimony or answers to open-ended questions” than they were
a structured interview.173 Thus a child’s statements still mimic
testimony at trial—except for the fatal fact that these statements may never be cross-examined or questioned.
The Supreme Court has emphasized the necessity of crossexamination in order to “tease out the truth” for trial.174 And
arguably, there is a greater need for cross-examination when
the witness is a child. The susceptibility of children has been a
long-standing concern in these types of cases.175 Although the
centers attempt to minimize the number of interviews a child
must endure, prosecutors, psychologists, and parents still may
meet with the child to rehearse his story many times.176 Parents, for example, have admitted to “relentlessly questioning
their children until they finally gave sway and admitted to [being] abuse[d].”177 One mother of an alleged victim admitted
that she repeatedly tried to get her child to say that he had
172.
173.
174.
175.

Id. at 876.
Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 828 n.1 (2006).
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 67 (2004).
See generally JOHN DORIS, THE SUGGESTIBILITY OF CHILDREN’S RECOLLECTIONS (1991) (providing a detailed study of child suggestibility). Some
say the evidence is inconclusive. John E.B. Myers et al., Hearsay Exceptions:
Adjusting the Ratio of Intuition to Psychological Science, 65 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 3, 29–32 (2002). But even adult memory has been proven to be fallible;
just consider the many cases of false confessions. See Beverly Monroe, Now I
Question Everything, in SURVIVING JUSTICE, supra note 115, at 203–18 (recalling the horror and confusion of falsely implicating herself ); Opinion, Justice
in the Central Park Jogger Case, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16, 2002, at A22 (detailing
the case in which five teenagers confessed to brutally raping a woman, noting
that false confessions are common, particularly under “intense interrogations”); Innocence Project, False Confessions, http://www.innocenceproject.org/
understand/False-Confessions.php (last visited Dec. 1, 2008) (noting that 25%
of DNA-exoneration cases involved false confessions).
176. See, e.g., Kaminsky, supra note 116, at 18 (discussing how a victim
met ten to fifteen times with the prosecutor, and at least once before his interview at the child advocacy center). Needless to say, there are no notes or recordings from these interviews. See, e.g., STEPHEN J. CECI & MAGGIE BRUCK,
JEOPARDY IN THE COURT ROOM: A SCIENTIFIC ANALYSIS OF CHILDREN’S TESTIMONY 161 (1995).
177. Frontline: Innocence Lost the Plea, supra note 138. One mother said
that while she repeatedly tried to get her child to say that he had been abused:
“It was ‘no’ the majority of the time . . . most of the time he didn’t know what I
was talking about.” Id. But ultimately the mother told police only that her son
said that he was abused. Id.
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been abused, even though the child adamantly denied it all but
once.178 By the time she got to police, however, she only told
them that her son had admitted to being abused, and police followed her lead.179
Moreover, when children are actually abused, they may
seek help but falsely accuse someone other than the true abuser “[i]n order to protect the family member but also get out of
the situation.”180 While child advocacy centers are designed to
reduce false accusations and minimize trauma to the child who
braves coming forward, the value of some of their techniques is
questionable.181 Using dolls can be perceived as playing pretend—deemphasizing the importance of telling the truth—and
books can be suggestive, especially if repeatedly read.182
Child advocacy interviewers do little to address these problems. As noted, the centers can receive money from law enforcement once they determine that a child was sexually
abused, but they collect nothing if they do not find evidence of
abuse.183 This monetary motivation makes it questionable
whether the centers ever investigate alternative theories to the
child’s stories or inquire into the weaknesses of the claims.184
In fact, it seems interviewers may not ask some of the most basic questions to check the reliability of the accusations.185

178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Kaminsky, supra note 116, at 18.
181. CECI & BRUCK, supra note 176, at 184 (“Simply put, we conclude that
there is no available scientific evidence that supports the clinical or forensic
diagnosis of abuse made primarily on the basis of a very young child’s interaction with anatomical dolls . . . .”).
182. Id.; CAMPBELL, supra note 117, at 61–84 (discussing the benefits and
potential consequences of different interviewing strategies).
183. See Kaminsky, supra note 116, at 18.
184. Id. (discussing the financial incentive for the center to find abuse).
185. The RATAC Protocol, for example, does not require checking reliability of the child’s statements. AM. PROSECUTOR RES. INST., supra note 80, at 2.
Though child advocates are trained to find corroboration in order to increase
chances for successful prosecution, id. at 7, minimal corroboration usually
comes from police officers or parents who may have their own incentives. See,
e.g., Frontline, Innocence Lost the Plea: Excerpt on Repeated Questioning,
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/innocence/readings/repeated
.html (last visited Sept. 19, 2008) (documenting the progression of a child’s
story after multiple interrogation sessions with his mother). Children can accuse the wrong family member of sexual abuse in order to get help. Kaminsky,
supra note 116. If the actual perpetrator is the parent, such corroboration is
useless.
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According to one director, “the objective of the interview . . .
is to collect salient details from reticent children,”186 but “it is
not [the] clinic’s role . . . to establish who else has talked to the
child, or whether the child may have been encouraged to fabricate allegations.”187 Indeed, unsupported stories like those in
the McMartin Preschool case have continued to occur, despite
the existence of these centers.188 Critics argue that the centers
actually fuel false memories by unconditionally encouraging
children to talk, rewarding them for doing so, and using anatomical dolls and suggestive children’s books beforehand.189
While some courts argue that the centers’ child-centric approach magically minimizes the level of formality to the interview,190 as Maryland noted, “[s]tatements in response to structured police interrogation are no less testimonial because the
police interrogator expresses empathy or friendship for the interviewee.”191 By extension, statements made to concerned
child advocates are still subject to testimonial scrutiny.192
When the structured formality of the interviews elicits responses from a child that resonates of testimony a witness would
give on the stand, without the benefit of any independent investigation into the statement’s veracity, the child’s statements
become “inherently testimonial.”193 The fact that the interrogation room has dolls and coloring books does not alter the for-

186. Kaminsky, supra note 116, at 16.
187. Id. at 22.
188. See, e.g., Frontline, supra note 123 (detailing many other tragic cases
occurring after the advent of child advocacy centers, even where children were
interviewed by therapists “specializing in diagnosing sexual abuse”).
189. CECI & BRUCK, supra note 176; see also CAMPBELL, supra note 117, at
86–92 (showing a case study of how the use of dolls and repeated questions
can be coercive).
190. See State v. Vigil, 127 P.3d 916, 921–26 (Colo. 2006) (finding that the
interview did not rise to the formality of an interrogation); Bobadilla II, 709
N.W.2d 243, 255 (Minn. 2006) (finding that the interviewer’s purpose was to
care for the child and not to gather a statement for trial).
191. State v. Snowden, 867 A.2d 314, 328 (Md. 2005).
192. Id.
193. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 830 (2006); see also State v. Hooper, No. 31025, 2006 WL 2328233, at *5 (Idaho Ct. App. Aug. 11, 2006); State
v. Henderson, 160 P.3d 776, 789–90 (Kan. 2007); State v. Justus, 205 S.W.3d
872, 877–81 (Mo. 2006) (holding that statements were testimonial because
they were not made “in the midst of an ongoing emergency”); State v. Blue,
717 N.W.2d 558 (N.D. 2006) (holding that the child claimant’s video-taped forensic interview was a formal statement); State v. Mack, 101 P.3d 349 (Or.
2004).
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mality of the interview, nor the Confrontation Clause analysis.194
In the end, child advocacy centers admirably attempt to
make child victims’ voices heard in the courtroom while protecting the children’s medical health and psychological wellbeing. The statements children make during forensic interviews, however, can be testimonial regardless of the multiple
purposes of child advocacy centers. The prosecutorial nature
during some interviews parallels the civil law abuses that the
Founders intended to avoid—prosecutors should not be directly
involved in questioning the alleged victim, interviewers should
not be paid according to prosecution rates, and police, prosecutors and child advocacy interviewers should subject the child’s
statements to some type of truth verification.
III. TESTIMONIAL PRESUMPTIONS:
HELPING JUDGES DETERMINE THE PURPOSE
OF CHILD ADVOCACY INTERVIEWS
As it currently exists, the primary-purpose test of Davis is
insufficient to resolve the issue of whether child advocacy center interviews are testimonial or nontestimonial. It allows
courts to evade the real issues that make statements testimonial when an interview may have multiple purposes. The
primary purpose test should not only take into consideration
Crawford circumstances—that is, the level of formality of an
interview, and the involvement of government agents195—but it
should expand to include presumptions that certain statements
are testimonial. Statements should be presumptively testimonial if police or prosecutors have been directly involved with
child advocacy centers, or if there was no alternative-theory
testing of a child’s story. Because these circumstances may not
always exist during the interviews, this solution provides an
important safety-valve for admitting statements that are nontestimonial. The state can overcome these presumptions provided they prove certain facts delineated below.

194. See Snowden, 867 A.2d at 327–28, (noting that even though the interview room “[bore] little resemblance to the torture chambers,” the child advocacy center’s “express purpose . . . was to provide a controlled and structured
environment for the questioning, or interrogation, of the children about their
accounts of a possible crime”).
195. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 56 (2004); see also Davis, 547
U.S. at 820–30.
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A. PRESUMPTION ONE: DIRECT PROSECUTORIAL INVOLVEMENT
While purportedly prioritizing the child’s health and welfare,196 as argued above, the centers often operate as satellite
offices for law enforcement, and the forensic interviews mimic
ex parte hearings when played before judge and jury without
opportunity for the defense to cross-examine. Therefore, statements should be presumed testimonial if prosecutors and police
are directly involved in the centers—they should not hide behind the trick mirrors or camera lenses of the interview
rooms,197 and determinations of whether a child has been
abused should not be polluted by monetary incentives.198 The
presumption that any statement made by a child during a forensic interview is testimonial should arise where: (1) police
were directly involved with the questioning of the child or had a
substantial physical presence, thus indicating prosecutorial
pressure on the interviewer; or (2) where the child advocacy
center is funded with money from prosecuting offices, thus indicating an incentive for the center to prosecute and convict alleged abusers.
While joint investigation statutes may still require collaboration with law enforcement,199 to protect the rights of the accused and to protect the admissibility of nontestimonial statements, the partnership should be as negligible as possible.
Police and prosecutors may refer children to the centers, but
they should not provide the interviewers with their version of
the facts. To be truly multidisciplinary, interviewers must independently conduct the questioning which will help assess the
child’s needs.200
The state may overcome this testimonial presumption if it
proves by clear and convincing evidence that the involvement of
196. See, e.g., CornerHouse, Forensic Interview Services, supra note 18.
197. See Davis, 547 U.S. at 823; Crawford, 541 U.S. at 56 n.7 (discussing
the importance of government involvement in the interview and the potential
for abuse); In re Rolandis, 817 N.E.2d 183, 186 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004) (describing
how police officers watched from a two-way mirror).
198. See, e.g., Kaminsky, supra note 116, at 18 (alleging that the center has
a financial incentive to find that child abuse had occurred in cases where it
had not).
199. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 626.556 (2006) (requiring prosecutors to work
with social services who report potential child sexual abuse cases).
200. See State v. Henderson, 160 P.3d 776, 789–90 (Kan. 2007); State v.
Justus, 205 S.W.3d 872, 880 (Mo. 2006) (arguing that the prosecutorial connections to the child advocacy centers make the child advocates’ work prosecutorial).
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law enforcement was ancillary to prosecution. Ancillary involvement would include referrals, competency questions regarding the child, other communications required under state
reporting laws, or communications relating to a different suspect.
B. PRESUMPTION TWO: THE LACK OF ALTERNATIVE-THEORY
TESTING
A child victim’s statements should likewise be presumptively testimonial if the interviewer does not engage in alternative-theory testing of the child. This presumption will arise
when interviewers fail to question the child on his understanding of the truth, whether someone else might be the abuser, or
how many times a child met with police officers or prosecutors.
By failing to pursue this line of questioning, the interviewer
rescinds the role of a holistic evaluator of the child’s welfare.201
The questioning then becomes prosecutorial because it simply
confirms what the state already believes.
The state may rebut this presumption by proving with
clear and convincing evidence that the interviewer was not attempting to confirm a pre-established story, but that he appropriately explored alternative explanations. Factors would include whether the interviewer used nonleading questions
throughout the interview, whether the interviewer questioned
the child’s inconsistent statements without favoring one version of events over another, whether the interviewer sought an
explanation for inconsistencies with other existing evidence,
and whether the interviewer conducted some inquiry into an
alternative perpetrator. The state may also prove that alternative-theory testing was completed at a prior time.
C. THE APPLICATION AND BENEFITS OF THE PRESUMPTIONS
Under this analysis, courts would be required to evaluate
the statements on a case-by-case basis, but the presumptions
will prevent state courts from ignoring testimonial circumstances by arbitrarily determining which one of the several purposes of the interview is primary.202 When a testimonial pre201. See CAMPBELL, supra note 117, at 61 (arguing that an interviewer’s
failure to inquire into basic facts fuels false accusations); cf. Bobadilla III, 570
F. Supp. 2d 1098, 1110–11 (D. Minn. 2008) (criticizing a child advocacy interviewer for using suggestive questions in what was “intended to substitute for a
separate interrogation by the police”).
202. See, e.g., State v. Krasky, 736 N.W.2d 636, 641 (Minn. 2007) (arguing
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sumption is held, a child’s statement would be inadmissible at
trial if the child is not able to testify. This protects defendants
from being convicted via videotape, and encourages child advocacy centers to avoid being centers for ex parte examinations,
thus strengthening their roles as true child welfare centers.
To result in a greater admissibility of interview statements, child advocacy centers should continue to follow a multidisciplinary approach, but in a way that integrates more medical treatment, psychotherapy, and social services by
extricating prosecutors and police from the interviews. Instead
of using prosecution as a form of advocacy work, the centers
should focus on policy work.203 By speaking at schools,
churches, and community organizations, child advocates can
teach about the devastating effects of child sexual abuse and
the necessity of coming forward to stop its dangerous cycle.204
CONCLUSION
The safety, welfare, and health of the child are supposed to
trump any goals of prosecution, or needs of the courts. However, certain aspects of the forensic interviews at child advocacy
centers can make a child’s out-of-court statements testimonial
regardless of the primary purpose of the questions. This Note
proposes that the Confrontation Clause analysis include rebuttable presumptions that direct prosecutorial involvement and a
lack of alternative-theory testing causes statements to be testimonial. This solution not only protects defendants by ensuring that courts focus on the true concerns of the Confrontation
Clause, but it also aids children by encouraging child advocacy
centers to limit prosecutorial involvement, thus protecting
them against potential psychological pressures by overeager
prosecutors. If such presumptions had been in place for Orlando Bobadilla—where a police officer sat in his accuser’s interview room while the questioner failed to test the truth of T.B.’s
statements—his constitutional rights would not have been violated.

that the intent of joint-investigation statutes makes statements nontestimonial).
203. See NCAC, The CAC Model, supra note 18 (discussing possibilities for
child advocacy policy work).
204. Id.

